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Abstract
Language is an imperfect and coarse means of communicating information about a
complex and nuanced world. We run an experimental investigation of a setting in which
the messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world, however
the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elab-
orateness of the message. As is standard in the communication literature, the sender
learns the state of the world then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes
the message and provides a best guess about the state. The incentives of the players
are aligned in the sense that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is in-
creasing in the accuracy of the receivers guess. We nd that the size of the language
endogenously arises as a function of the costs of communication. Specically, we nd that
higher communication costs are associated a smaller language. Although the equilibrium
predictions do not perform well, this divergence occurs in a manner which is consistent
with the experimental communication literature: overcommunication. For the receiver,
there is a positive relationship between the payo¤s relative to the equilibrium predictions
and communication costs. This relationship is negative for the senders. We also nd that
the response times of both the senders and receivers are negatively, not positively, related
to their payo¤s.
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1 Introduction
Words exhibit properties very di¤erent from those of real numbers. For instance, it is not the
case that there exists a word with a meaning between any two words. However, words are
used to construct statements which convey information about a complex and nuanced reality.
One can use words to express more and more detailed and nuanced information, but only
at a cost to the sender. It is our view that language is an imperfect and coarse means of
communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We run an experimental
investigation of a setting in which the language available to the sender imperfectly describes
the state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing
the complexity or elaborateness of the message.
Suppose, that your advisee has been invited to present at a conference. Your prefer-
ences and the preferences of your student are identical with regards to her performance at
the conference: sound competent, receive helpful comments, etc. In order to facilitate this
success, you wish to provide the student with information about how to best have a successful
conference. However, there is not a single word to convey the full extent of your knowledge
regarding how best to present, how best to prepare the slides, best to respond to potential
questions, etc. You can increase the amount of information conveyed only by constructing
additional statements. As a result, you are unlikely to communicate all of the information
which is relevant. Further, the amount of information which you provide will be related to
the costs which you bear in the construction of the statements.
Hertel and Smith (2011) adapt the uniform-quadratic version of Crawford and Sobel (1982)
so that messages available to the sender are constrained to be costly and discrete. The
authors employ an an out-of-equilibrium condition, whereby under this condition only the
most informative class of equilibria remains. The paper makes the prediction that more
costly signals will be conserved (sent on smaller regions of the state space) and that the size
of the language used will arise in equilibrium. The present paper could be viewed as an
experimental test of the setup and predictions of Hertel and Smith (2011).
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In this experiment, the subjects are anonymously divided into pairs, one as a sender and
one as a receiver. As is standard in the communication literature, the sender learns the state
of the world then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes the message and
selects an action which a¤ects the payo¤s of both players. The incentives of the players are
aligned in the sense that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in
the accuracy of the receivers action.
We make two notable departures from the literature. First, the set of messages imperfectly
relate to the underlying state space. Second, in order to transmit a more elaborate message,
a larger communication cost is incurred by the sender. Here the state space is an integer
between  3 and 3. The sender can send a costless message, which we refer to as the empty
message.1 Additionally, the sender can compose a costly message consisting of two possible
elements "High" and "Low." Given our state space, these message elements would seem to
provide a natural ordering. The cost of a message is then a function of the number of elements
in the message. Therefore, the empty message can be transmitted at a cost of 0; the messages
"High" and "Low" can be transmitted at a cost of c; and the messages "High High," "High
Low," "Low High" and "Low Low" can be transmitted at a cost of 2c, where we vary c.
We nd that the size of the language arises endogenously as a function of the costs of
communication. Also, we nd that the equilibrium predictions do not perform well. However,
our experimental observations di¤er from the theoretical predictions in a manner consistent
with other experimental communication papers: the senders are overcommunicating. We nd
that there is a negative relationship between the senders payo¤s relative to the equilibrium
payo¤s and the communication costs. However, we nd a positive relationship between the
receivers payo¤s relative to the equilibrium payo¤s and the communication costs. We also
nd that the response time is negatively related to the payo¤s relative to the equilibrium
payo¤s, for both senders and receivers.
1Throughout the paper we describe the costless message as empty rather than the condition of having not
received a message. This is because, it might not be easy to distinguish between the sender having decided not
to send a message and the sender having not yet sent a message. To rule out this confusion we describe the
costless message as empty.
3
2 Related Literature
There is a literature which tests existing communication models in general and the Crawford
and Sobel (1982) model in particular. Perhaps the rst paper testing Crawford and Sobel
was Dickhaut et. al. (1995) whereas more recent examples include Cai and Wang (2006), and
Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009). Due to the limited ability of subjects to nd complex equilibria
in novel situations, testing communication equilibria typically uses simplied versions of the
model. A natural way to accomplish this simplication is to specify the state space as a set
of integers rather than the unit interval. For instance, Dickhaut et. al. species the state
space as the integers between 1 and 4 and Cai and Wang species the state space as an integer
between 1 and 9. We select a state space as the set of integers between  3 and 3 in order
to render the signal elements of "High" and "Low" relatively meaningful. Further, we hoped
that the empty message would be used to denote the set around the state 0. This would
seem to aid in the coordination problem2 between the sender and receiver. Also note that in
Dickhaut et. al. (1995), Cai and Wang (2006), and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009) there is
a one-to-one relationship between the state and the set of feasible signals. By contrast, for
su¢ ciently high communication costs (c), in out paper there is no such protable relationship.
Studies of cheap talk communication have found that the senders often overcommunicate.3
Relatedly there is a literature which nds that subjects can have an aversion to lying.4 Again,
this literature nds that senders overcommunicate. Note that our subjects never have an
incentive to mislead the sender because the sender and receiver have identical preferences over
the action of the receiver. Despite the fact that our experimental environment is quite di¤erent
from the setting in these two literatures, we also nd that the senders overcommunicate. Given
that we observe similar behavior in such di¤erent settings, we argue that overcommunication
is a robust phenomenon.
2Prior work nds that subjects can resolve similar coordination problems (Blume et. al., 1998, 2001; Blume
and Gneezy, 2000; Kreps, 1990). However this is not the focus of our paper.
3For example, see Cai and Wang (2006) and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009).
4For instance, Gneezy (2005), Hurkens and Kartik (2009), and Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz (2007, 2009).
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Economists have recently become interested in studying the response times of subjects.5
Research has found that longer response times are associated with more strategic and less
automatic reasoning. Consistent with this research, we nd that longer response times are
associated with a larger language used by the senders. However, we nd that longer response
times are also associated with lower per period payo¤s for both senders and receivers.
3 Equilibrim Predictions
As mentioned previously, there are many equilibria in our model. We now discuss the most
informative equilibria in our setting.6 Recall that our state space is s 2 f 3;  2;  1; 0; 1;
2; 3g. Our message space is m 2 ? [ ([2i=1fHigh; Lowgi). The communication costs c(m)
are a function of the number of elements transmitted. The receiver has an action space of
a 2 f 3; 2:5;  2;  1:5;  1; 0:5; 0; 0:5; 1; 1:5; 2; 2:5; 3g. Both the sender and receiver
prefer the receiver to select the action as close to the state as possible. Specically, in each
period, the payo¤ to the receiver was the nonnegative integer closest to:
UR = 100  25(a  s)2. (1)
In each period, the payo¤ to the sender was the integer closest to:
US = UR   c(m). (2)
For c 2 [0; 12:5], any fully revealing equilibria will exist. Specically, each message is used
and a single message is sent for each state. For c 2 [0; 25] then all fully revealing equilibria
will exist, with the exception that adjacent states do not have a di¤erence in communication
cost of 2c. In each of these fully revealing equilibria, the ex-ante payo¤s are identical: the
expected payo¤ for the receiver in each equilibria is EUR = 100 and the expected payo¤ for
5For instance, Rubinstein (2007), Brañas-Garza and Miller (2008), Piovesan and Wengström (2009), Frank
(2010), Matthey and Regner (2011), and Chabris et. al. (2008).
6See Hertel and Smith (2011) for further discussion of the modeling choices. For reasons which are specied
in their paper, Hertel and Smith assume that each message has a unique cost of transmission. This would
seem to be less natural in an experimental setting.
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the sender in each equilibria is EUS = EUR   107 c.
For c 2 [25; 94], the equilibria is such that the messages with two elements are not used.
Messages "High" and "Low" are each sent on 2 adjacent states and the empty message is sent
on 3 adjacent states. The expected payo¤ of the receiver is EUR = 1007 + 2  757 + 4  947 . The
expected payo¤ for the sender is EUS = EUR   47c. It should be noted that the equilibrium
predictions are identical within each of the intervals mentioned. Therefore, the predictions
for equilibrium behavior are the same whether c = 26 or 93.
For c 2 [94; 100] then the equilibria is such that the messages with two elements are not
used. Messages "High" and "Low" are each sent on the extreme states, 3 and  3. The
empty message is sent on the remaining states. Given the empty message, the receiver is
indi¤erent between selecting  0:5 and 0:5. The expected payo¤ to the receiver is EUR =
2  947 + 2  447 + 2  1007 . The expected payo¤ to the sender is EUS = EUR   27c. Note that
the receiver is indi¤erent between selecting  0:5 and 0:5 but not 0. If the sender is pooling
on more than 3 states, the expected payo¤ of selecting  0:5 or 0:5 is 2  947 + 2  447 = 2867 and
the expected payo¤ of selecting 0 is 1007 + 2  757 = 2507 . Therefore, selecting an integer action
yields a lower payo¤.
For c > 100 then the only equilibria is one in which the sender only sends the empty
message for all states and the receiver has no additional information about the state and is
therefore indi¤erent among selecting  1:5; 0:5; 0:5 and 1:5. The expected payo¤s are then
EUR = EUS = 2  947 + 2  447 .
4 Experimental Design
A total of 48 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects were both undergraduate
and graduate students at Rutgers University-Camden. The experiment was programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions lasted from 90 to 120
minutes.
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In each period, the sender was shown the state, which we referred to as the "secret number."
The state s consisted of an integer between  3 and 3. In order to inform the receiver of its
content, the sender was able to transmit a possibly costly message. The message "Empty
message" cost c(m) = 0, the messages "High" and "Low" each cost c(m) = c, the messages
"High High," "High Low," "Low High," and "Low Low," each cost c(m) = 2c, where c 2 f10;
30; 50; 96g. Upon observing the message, the receiver selected a best guess about the state.
The receivers action a was selected from the action space of half integers between  3 and 3.
The per period payo¤ to the receiver was the nonnegative integer closest to 100 25(a s)2.
The per period payo¤ to the sender was the integer closest to the receivers payo¤s minus c(m).
In order to aid in the comprehension of their payo¤s, the subjects were given a table indicating
the payo¤s associated with each state and action selected by the receiver.7 The subjects were
given a $5 show up fee and $1 for every 300 points accumulated.8
Sender and receiver were matched and played the game for 15 periods where c was held
xed. After the 15 periods, each subject was rematched with a di¤erent opponent, each
switched role as sender and receiver, and played with a new value of c. Each trial consisted of
4 rounds of 15 periods. The subjects were made aware of these matching procedures. We ran
two treatments which consisted of 8 subjects and two treatments of 16 subjects. Therefore,
we have a total of 1440 data points for both senders and receivers.
A few comments on our methodology are in order. Since we expected overcommunication,
even though only the senders incurred the communication costs, we designed the experiment
to reduce the social preferences of the sender towards the receiver. First, we emphasized
the di¤erences in the payo¤s by displaying the per period payo¤ of both subjects. Second,
we emphasized the anonymous matching whereby after each round of 15 periods, the players
would be rematched with a new partner. This was done in order to discourage any implicit
reciprocal play.
7See the appendix for this table.
8The total amount earned in the experiment ranged from $6:29 to $20:54, with an average of $15:62.
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Additionally, many experimental communication papers rematch the subjects after each
period. However, we decided not to rematch, as there is a reasonably di¢ cult coordination
problem, which would be aggravated by rematching after every period. Finally, note that we
constrain the receivers payo¤s to be nonnegative. This experimental feature was designed to
make the payo¤s easier to understand, and to avoid very negative payo¤s for the receiver.
5 Results
In each of the four rounds, the subjects exhibited learning across periods 1-15. Across all
periods, the relationship between the senders payo¤s and the period in which it was obtained
is very signicant (p = 0:01). However, within periods 5-15, the relationship is not signicant
(p = 0:7). Therefore, within each round, we exclude from consideration the data obtained in
periods 1-4.9
We rst ask whether the size of the language arises endogenously as a function of the cost
of communication. In other words, are expensive signals conserved when communication is
costly? To address this question we run logistic regressions with three di¤erent measures of
the size of the language. In the rst logistic regression, the dependent variable is a dummy
indicating whether the message was empty. We assign a value of 1 in the event that the
message was empty, and a 0 otherwise. We refer to this regression as "Empty." In the
second specication, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the message was
either empty or either "High" or "Low." We refer to this regression as "Empty or One."
In contrast to the two binary logistic regressions above, in the third specication, we run an
ordered multinomial logistic regression. In this specication, the dependent variable is the
number of elements in the message. In other words, we assign a value of 0 for the empty
message, a value of 1 for the messages "High" or "Low" and 2 otherwise. We refer to this
regression as "Number of Elements." In each of the regressions below, we include controls
for the state because it is not obvious, given a particular communication cost, that a message
9We do not explore whether there was learning across rounds, because each subject experienced only one
of the following two sequences of communication costs: 10  50  30  96 and 96  30  50  10.
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would be appropriate for all states. Further, for all regressions below, we account for the
subject specic xed e¤ects. Note that in the output below, we do not list the estimations of
intercepts and that each regression has n = 1056. We list the results below in Table.1.
Empty Empty or One Number of Elements
Communication Costs 0:0401 0:0140  0:0195
(0:00743) (0:00553) (0:00405)
-2 log L 412:8 812:1 1365:2
LR 2 796:3 548:3 924:3
Table 1: Results of logistic regressions where *** indicates signicance at
p < 0:01 and ** indicates signicance at p < 0:05. Each regression accounts for
the subject specic xed e¤ects and state dummy variables.
In each of our three specications, we nd evidence that the size of the language is af-
fected by the communication costs. In other words, we nd that more expensive signals are
conserved when communication becomes costly. In the rst specication, we see that higher
communication costs are associated with a greater likelihood of sending the empty message.
We see the analogous result in the second specication: there is a relationship between com-
munication costs and the transmission of the messages "Empty", "High" or "Low." Finally, in
the third specication we see that higher communication costs are associated with the trans-
mission of lower cost messages. In short, the results summarized in Table 1 suggest that the
size of the language used arises endogenously as a function of the cost of communication.
As a robustness check, we perform the analogous analysis, but include the average payo¤s
entering the period, within the current match. Again note that we do not list the estimates of
the intercepts and that n = 1056 for each regression. We list the results of these regressions
below in Table 2.
Empty Empty or One Number of Elements
Communication Costs 0:0467 0:0147  0:0223
(0:00806) (0:00594) (0:00421)
Average Payo¤s  0:00868  0:00422 0:00498
(0:00352) (0:00181) (0:00160)
Costs-Average Payo¤s Interaction 0:000127 0:000048  0:000069
(0:000059) (0:000039) (0:000030)
-2 log L 406:4 806:0 1355:4
LR 2 802:7 554:3 934:1
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Table 2: Results of logistic regressions where *** indicates signicance at
p < 0:01 and ** indicates signicance at p < 0:05. Each regression accounts for
the subject specic xed e¤ects and a dummy for each state.
We rst note that the qualitative ndings from Table 1 also hold here in Table 2: the
senders are conserving higher cost messages when communication is costly. The new insight
which emerges is that we observe that lower average payo¤s are associated with transmission
of the empty message. We see the analogous result for the "Empty or One" regression. We
also note that lower average payo¤s are associated with sending a less costly message. We also
note that there is evidence that the average prot and the communication costs are interacting.
Specically, we nd that higher communication costs are associated with a greater sensitivity
of the relationship between average payo¤s and the likelihood of sending an empty or a less
costly message.
The results of the regressions summarized in Table 2 suggest that senders are jointly
considering the communication costs and the average payo¤s obtained in the match when
deciding on the size of the language. In particular, it seems that the senders are weighing
whether the costs of the messages are less than their benets. This determination is based
on both the direct cost incurred by sending the message and the prociency of the receiver in
selecting the appropriate action.
Up to this point, we have found that communication costs shrink the size of the language
used and previous success within the match increases the size of the language. It is natural
to ask about the relationship between the strategic considerations of the senders and the size
of the language. To address this, we examine the response time of the subjects. Again,
we perform the analogous analysis as in Table 2, however we also include the time remaining
when the subject sends the message.
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Empty Empty or One Number of Elements
Comm. Costs 0:0732 0:0776 0:0294 0:0315  0:0386  0:0388
(0:0204) (0:0220) (0:0111) (0:0113) (0:00967) (0:00955)
Average Payo¤s  0:00959  0:0144  0:00349 0:00055 0:00451 0:00199
(0:00367) (0:00741) (0:00184) (0:0041) (0:00163) (0:00353)
Costs-AP Int. 0:000141 0:000138 0:000037 0:000033  0:00007  0:00007
(0:000061) (0:00006) (0:00004) (0:00004) (0:000031) (0:000031)
Time Remaining 0:139 0:162 0:0851 0:0821  0:0937  0:0887
(0:0578) (0:0686) (0:0272) (0:0262) (0:0254) (0:0255)
Costs-Time Int.  0:00106  0:0012  0:00072  0:00085 0:00069 0:000711
(0:000804) (0:0009) (0:00046) (0:00048) (0:00040) (0:000391)
Prot-Time Int.   0:00022    0:00020   0:00011
(0:00029) (0:00017) (0:00014)
-2 log L 396:2 395:6 569:0 790:1 1334:1 1333:5
LR 2 813:0 813:5 791:3 570:3 955:3 955:9
Table 3: Results of logistic regressions where *** indicates signicance at
p < 0:01, ** indicates signicance at p < 0:05, and * indicates signicance at
p < 0:1. Each regression accounts for the subject specic xed e¤ects and a
dummy for each state.
Again the basic results the results summarized in Tables 1 and 2, hold when we account
for the response time. Again, we nd that higher communication costs are associated with a
smaller language. Additionally, we nd evidence that average payo¤s are associated with a
larger language. However, Table 3 reveals some additional results regarding response times.
First, note that a larger time remaining is associated with a smaller language. In each of the
6 specications in Table 3, we see that a faster response is associated with a conservation of
costly messages, according to each of our three measures. This suggests that the subjects
who expend a greater time thinking about their action, and hence could be described as acting
more strategically, employ a larger language than do the subjects who do not spend such time
deliberation about their action.
One might conjecture that there will be an interaction between the communication cost
and the response time. This relationship could arise as a result of the relative simplicity of
the equilibrium when there are large communication costs. It might also be conjectured that
there will be an interaction between the average payo¤s and response time. This could be
due to the fact that lower average payo¤s might make the decision easier, and hence there
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would be a greater sensitivity to response time. Howerver, we do not nd evidence in support
of either of these conjectures. In particular we nd only very weak evidence in support of
an interaction between the communication cost and the response time. We also do not nd
evidence in support of an interaction between the average prot and the response time.
We now turn our attention to the overall performance of the subjects, as measured by their
payo¤s. This allows us to ask, "How are the subjects performing relative to the equilibrium
predictions?" We rst note that the equilibrium predictions do not perform particularly
well. Within each communication cost treatment, there is a signicant di¤erence between the
senders payo¤s and the equilibrium prediction. In all but the highest cost treatment, there
is a signicant di¤erence between the receivers payo¤s and the equilibrium prediction. This
data is presented in Table 4.
Sender Receiver
Equilibrium Actual Equilibrium Actual
c = 10 85:71 67:13 100:00 81:03
c = 30 72:29 47:16 89:43 84:09
c = 50 60:86 29:60 89:43 76:00
c = 96 40:57  6:14 68:00 69:86
Table 4: Equilibrium predictions of payo¤s and actual mean payo¤s for senders
and receivers according communication costs. Results of one-sample t-tests each
with 263 degrees of freedom, where *** indicates signicance of a one-sided test
at p < 0:01.
Recall that the receivers payo¤s correspond to the accuracy of the receivers action and the
senders payo¤s correspond to this accuracy minus the cost of the message sent. A glance at
Table 1 suggests that as communication costs increase, the actions are becoming more accurate
yet the senders are doing worse relative to the equilibrium predictions. This suggests that
the senders are overcommunicating. In particular, Table 4 suggests that the senders payo¤s
vary too much with communication costs and the receivers payo¤s do not vary enough. We
perform the following analysis in order to test this speculation.
In regressions (S1)  (S4) of Table 5, the dependent variable is the senders actual payo¤s
minus the senders equilibrium payo¤s. In regressions (R1)  (R4) of Table 6, the dependent
12
variable is the receivers actual payo¤s minus the receivers equilibrium payo¤s. In regressions
(S1) and (R1), we employ no additional controls. In regressions (S2) and (R2), we account for
the subject specic xed e¤ects. In regressions (S3) and (R3), we account for the information
known by the subject at the time of the decision. In the case of the receiver (R3), this is the
message observed, and in the case of the sender (S3), this is the state observed. Finally, in
regressions (S4) and (R4) we account for the subject specic xed e¤ects and the information
known by the subject at the time of the decision. Each regression has n = 1056.
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4)
Intercept  15:2  11:5  27:9  22:6
(2:81) (10:2) (4:59) (9:75)
Communication Costs  0:327  0:335  0:320  0:321
(0:0497) (0:0819) (0:0455) (0:0726)
Subject Fixed E¤ects No Y es No Y es
State Dummy No No Y es Y es
R2 0:04 0:23 0:21 0:40
Table 5: Results of regressions where the dependent variable is the senders
actual payo¤s minus senders equilibrium payo¤s, and *** indicates signicance at
p < 0:01 and ** indicates signicance at p < 0:05.
(R1) (R2) (R3) (R4)
Intercept  18:4  40:2 0:374  17:5
(1:88) (7:90) (3:97) (8:61)
Communication Costs 0:203 0:388 0:212 0:351
(0:0333) (0:0553) (0:0342) (0:0546)
Subject Fixed E¤ects No Y es No Y es
Message Dummy No No Y es Y es
R2 0:03 0:21 0:086 0:26
Table 6: Results of regressions where the dependent variable is the receivers
actual payo¤s minus receivers equilibrium payo¤s, and *** indicates signicance
at p < 0:01 and ** indicates signicance at p < 0:05.
First, note that in Table 5, every specication involving communication costs has a nega-
tive and signicant estimate. This suggests that as communication costs increase, the senders
do worse relative to the equilibrium predictions. We note the opposite e¤ect for the receivers.
Table 6 shows that the estimates of the coe¢ cient for communication costs are positive and
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signicant. Therefore, as the communication costs increase, the receivers do better relative
to the equilibrium predictions.
At this point it is natural to ask about the relationship between the strategic considerations
of the subjects and their payo¤s. Again, we use response times to address this issue. In the
regression below we include the time remaining when the decision is made and the interaction
between the communication costs and the time remaining. Each regression has n = 1056.
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4)
Intercept  41:7  33:9  49:2  37:9
(8:71) (13:0) (9:15) (12:5)
Communication Costs  0:721  0:660  0:697  0:580
(0:155) (0:170) (0:142) (0:152)
Time Remaining 1:15 1:02 0:848 0:641
(0:367) (0:377) (0:341) (0:342)
Cost-Time Interaction 0:0176 0:0153 0:0169 0:0122
(0:00657) (0:00677) (0:00603) (0:00607)
Subject Fixed E¤ects No Y es No Y es
State Dummy No No Y es Y es
R2 0:10 0:27 0:25 0:42
Table 7: Results of regressions where the dependent variable is the senders
actual payo¤s minus senders equilibrium payo¤s, and *** indicates signicance
at p < 0:01, ** indicates signicance at p < 0:05, and * indicates signicance at
p < 0:1.
(R1) (R2) (R3) (R4)
Intercept  36:2  56:3  16:6  30:5
(6:30) (10:2) (7:68) (11:1)
Communication Costs 0:0734 0:329 0:0920 0:290
(0:111) (0:124) (0:111) (0:124)
Time Remaining 0:783 0:731 0:599 0:499
(0:272) (0:285) (0:278) (0:292)
Cost-Time Interaction 0:00619 0:00314 0:00609 0:00357
(0:00488) (0:00519) (0:00483) (0:00512)
Subject Fixed E¤ects No Y es No Y es
Message Dummy No No Y es Y es
R2 0:07 0:23 0:11 0:27
Table 8: Results of regressions where the dependent variable is the receivers
actual payo¤s minus receivers equilibrium payo¤s, and *** indicates signicance
at p < 0:01, ** indicates signicance at p < 0:05, and * indicates signicance at
p < 0:1.
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Much of the main results of Tables 5 and 6, also hold here in Tables 7 and 8. In particular,
in all 4 specications in Table 7, we see that communication costs are negatively related to
the senders payo¤s relative to equilibrium payo¤s. Also, there is some evidence that the
communication costs are positively related to the receivers payo¤s relative to equilibrium
payo¤s.
Also note the results of Tables 7 and 8 involving the time it took the subject to make the
choice. Perhaps surprisingly, in each of the 8 specications there was a positive relationship
between the time remaining and the payo¤s relative to equilibrium payo¤s. In other words,
subjects who made their decision more quickly, did better than subjects who reected further
on their choice.
We mention two other features of the results presented in Tables 7 and 8. First, the
senders exhibit an interaction between communication costs and the time remaining. Speci-
cally, there is evidence that, given higher communication costs, there is a stronger relationship
between the time remaining and payo¤s relative to equilibrium payo¤s. This result seems to
suggest that spending time thinking about the message is markedly unhelpful when commu-
nication costs are large. In contrast, there is no evidence of the analogous interaction for the
receivers. In particular, there is no signicant interaction between the communication costs
and the time remaining. So it seems that the unhelpfulness of additional time thinking about
the problem does not vary with the cost of communication.
The results summarized in Tables 5 and 7 provide evidence that the senders are overcom-
municating. In other words, the senders are not su¢ ciently conserving expensive words and
as a result, there is a negative relationship between communication costs and sender payo¤s
relative to equilibrium payo¤s. Further, the results summarized in Tables 6 and 8 provide
evidence of a positive relationship between communication costs and receiver payo¤s relative
to equilibrium payo¤s. In other words, the overcommunication seems to be beneting the
receiver.
The questions are then, "How robust is the nding that senders are overcommunicating?"
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and "Is the positive relationship between communication costs and receiver payo¤s caused by
the receivers making better decisions or are they merely beneting from the overcommunica-
tion of the senders?"
To answer these questions we run a series of discrete choice multinomial logits. Designed
for use in the analysis of experiments, McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) developed the Agent
Quantal Response Equilibrium (AQRE). This nonequilibrium concept assumes that subjects
will not perfectly play the equilibrium strategies and a free parameter is a measure of the
errors committed by the subjects. Several researchers have estimated the AQRE parameter
in order to measure the proximity of the observed play to that predicted by equilibrium.10
However, in our setting, there is a great deal of computational complexity, which is not
present in the previous studies. In other words, we are not eager to solve a 140 parameter
xed point problem.11 As a result, we estimate the multinomial choice logits as follows. For
the sender we estimate Sc , where pm(s; c) is the probability of transmitting message m
0 given
state s and communication cost c:
pm0(s; c) =
e
S
c  um0 (s;c)P
m2M e
S
c  um(s;c)
: (3)
In expression (3), the term um0(s; c) is the observed expected payo¤s for the sender by sending
message m when the state is s are communication costs are c. We calculate um0(s; c) by noting
the observed relationship between the actions of the receiver upon observing message m. For
the receiver, we estimate Rc , were qa0(m; c) is the probability of selecting action a
0 given
message m and communication cost c:
qa0(m; c) =
e
R
c  ua0 (m;c)P
a2A e
R
c  ua(m;c)
: (4)
In expression (4), the term ua(m; c) is the observed expected payo¤s for the receiver by
10For intance, see Cason and and Reynolds (2005), Guarnaschelli et. al. (2000), Goeree and Holt (2002),
and Baye and Morgan (2004).
11The sender has 49 pure strategies (7 states x 7 messages) , and the reciever has 91 pure strategies (7
messages x 13 actions).
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selecting action a, when the message is m and communication costs are c. We calculate
ua(m; c) by noting the observed relationship between the message transmitted by the sender
upon observing state s.
As with the AQRE parameter, a higher estimate of our parameter implies that subjects
are making decisions closer to the optimal decision. However there are several important
di¤erences between our estimates and the estimates of the AQRE parameter. Note that,
unlike AQRE analyses, we are not estimating a xed point problem. As such, we estimate
di¤erent parameters for the sender and receiver. Further, we estimate our parameters by
using the observed frequency of the strategies of the complementary players. The estimate
the senders parameter is based on the observed frequency of the receivers strategy, and the
estimate the receivers parameter is based on the observed frequency of the senders strategy.
In the table below, we present a summary of our estimates.
Sender Receiver
c = 10 0:03418 0:0609
(0:00224) (0:00456)
c = 30 0:02745 0:0665
(0:00173) (0:00500)
c = 50 0:02621 0:0520
(0:00169) (0:00364)
c = 96 0:01443 0:0455
(0:0008975) (0:00345)
Table 9: Maximum likelihood estimates of multinomial logistic choice parame-
ter in expressions (3) and (4), with standard errors in parentheses. The estimate
within each cell is based on 264 observations.
Table 9 presents evidence that the both the senders and receivers are making worse
decisions as the communication costs increase, however this seems to be more acute for the
sender. This sender estimates in Table 9 corroborate the evidence found in Tables 5 and 7,
namely that the senders are making worse decisions as communication becomes costly. On
the other hand, the receiver estimates in Table 9 suggest that the positive relationship between
receiver payo¤s and communication costs is not caused by better decision making, but rather
the receivers are beneting from the overcommunication of the senders.
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6 Conclusions
We run an experiment where the messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the
state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing
the complexity or elaborateness of the message. The incentives of the players are aligned in
that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in the accuracy of the
receivers action. Although the equilibrium predictions of Hertel and Smith (2011) do not
perform well, our experimental results do corroborate some of the qualitative predictions. In
particular, we nd that the size of the language arises endogenously as a function of the cost
of communication.
Further, the di¤erences between our observations and the equilibrium predictions are con-
sistent with other experimental communication papers: the senders overcommunicate. As a
result of this overcommunication, there is a negative relationship between the cost of com-
munication and the senders payo¤s relative to the equilibrium predictions. The receivers
benet from this overcommunication, as we observe a positive relationship between the cost
of communication and the receivers payo¤s relative to the equilibrium predictions.
Consistent with the response time literature, we nd that the response time is related to
the size of the language used by the sender. However, we also nd that the response time of
both the sender and receiver are negatively related to payo¤s. In other words, we nd that
less, and not more, time deliberating about the decision leads to better outcomes. How do we
interpret the response time results? It is possible that there exists unobserved heterogeneity
among the subjects and this drives the results. Specically, it is possible that subjects who
respond in a shorter period of time are more procient in the game. To some extent the
data supports this view, because the response time results are weaker when we account for
the subject specic xed e¤ects.12 However, when we account for the subject specic xed
e¤ects, the relationship still persists.
12To our knowledge, Piovesan and Wengström (2009) is the only other paper which analyzes response times
and conducts a xed e¤ects analysis.
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Although there are signicant di¤erences between the equilibrium predictions and our
observations, we are encouraged by our results. As mentioned, these di¤erences are largely due
to the overcommunication of the senders. Since observing overcommunication in experimental
settings is common, we do not nd this divergence to be problematic. Further, the main
insights from Hertel and Smith (2011) are observed in our experimental setting: the size of
the language employed is determined by the cost of communication. As a result, it would
seem to be protable to think more about theoretical and experimental issues related to costly
and discrete communication.
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8 Appendix
Although the payo¤s were specied by equations (1) and (2), the subjects were also presented
with the following table.
Action
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
-3 100 94 74 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-2 75 94 100 94 74 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-1 0 44 75 94 100 94 74 44 0 0 0 0 0
State 0 0 0 0 44 75 94 100 94 74 44 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 44 75 94 100 94 74 44 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 75 94 100 94 75
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 75 94 100
Senders Screen
22
Receivers Screen
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8.1 Outcomes
Messages sent by the senders given the state observed and communication costs
c = 10 Messages
Empty High Low Low Low Low High High Low High High
 3 1 1 1 31 3 2 0
 2 1 1 21 4 19 1 0
States  1 0 0 16 0 14 3 0
0 34 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 4 14 0 7 18 0
2 1 19 0 1 2 9 3
3 0 9 0 0 0 0 22
c = 30 Messages
Empty High Low Low Low Low High High Low High High
 3 0 1 5 26 0 1 0
 2 0 0 27 5 5 3 0
States  1 6 1 10 0 11 2 0
0 27 4 1 0 2 2 0
1 16 7 4 0 6 10 1
2 2 29 0 0 1 11 0
3 0 12 0 0 0 0 26
c = 50 Messages
Empty High Low Low Low Low High High Low High High
 3 2 0 23 14 0 0 2
 2 1 1 32 0 3 0 0
States  1 16 0 16 1 7 0 0
0 36 0 2 1 0 0 0
1 18 4 8 1 1 4 0
2 3 29 0 0 2 9 0
3 0 15 1 0 0 0 12
c = 96 Messages
Empty High Low Low Low Low High High Low High High
 3 4 2 20 18 1 1 0
 2 8 0 12 1 2 2 0
States  1 20 0 13 2 5 0 0
0 35 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 25 4 3 0 0 5 0
2 13 27 0 1 0 1 0
3 5 18 0 0 0 0 16
24
Action selected by the receivers given the message and communication costs
c = 10 Action
 3  2:5  2  1:5  1  0:5 0 0:5 1 1:5 2 2:5 3
Empty 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 1 0 0 0 0 0
High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 22 7 2
Low 3 2 19 11 6 3 1 1 6 1 0 0 0
Messages Low Low 30 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Low High 3 3 14 4 10 1 1 0 6 3 0 1 0
High Low 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 15 7 6 0 0
High High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 21
c = 30 Action
 3  2:5  2  1:5  1  0:5 0 0:5 1 1:5 2 2:5 3
Empty 0 0 0 0 0 2 49 0 0 0 0 0 0
High 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 8 22 17 3
Low 2 6 20 9 6 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0
Messages Low Low 28 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Low High 0 0 4 1 11 1 1 0 5 0 2 0 0
High Low 0 0 4 1 2 0 2 0 9 4 7 0 0
High High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 26
c = 50 Action
 3  2:5  2  1:5  1  0:5 0 0:5 1 1:5 2 2:5 3
Empty 0 1 2 0 1 2 59 5 4 1 1 0 0
High 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 15 15 8
Low 6 12 16 18 20 2 2 0 3 3 0 0 0
Messages Low Low 14 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Low High 0 0 2 0 6 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0
High Low 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 7 1 0
High High 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
c = 96 Action
 3  2:5  2  1:5  1  0:5 0 0:5 1 1:5 2 2:5 3
Empty 3 4 1 7 4 4 58 8 8 6 4 1 2
High 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 17 9 16
Low 11 6 12 3 8 1 0 0 5 0 0 2 0
Messages Low Low 18 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Low High 0 0 1 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
High Low 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 1 1 0 0
High High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
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